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PROSECUTORS AND POLICE: AN UNHOLY UNION
Maybell Romero *
“Prosecutors work with police day in, day out, and typically
they’re reluctant to criticise them or investigate them.”1
INTRODUCTION
In June of 1989 John Buchanan, with the National Institute of
Justice, observed what was then a persistent problem: a “frequent
and characteristic want of cooperation between the investigating
and prosecuting agencies in the same locality.”2 The same bulletin
notes, however, that investigating officers and prosecutors started
breaking “new ground” at the time, “work[ing] closely together
every step of the way, focusing on the same goal—conviction.”3
Those who follow the present-day relationships between police
and prosecutors, not merely in the enforcement of criminal codes
but also in the political realm, may feel some surprise that there
was such a disconnect between the two camps. Prosecutors often
seem unwilling to initiate prosecutions against police officers who
employ excessive force, even when that force sometimes leads to
* Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., 2006, U.C.
Berkeley School of Law; B.A., 2003, Cornell University. Many thanks to Kay Levine, Ron
Wright, Ben Levin, Bruce Green, Jennifer Laurin, Miriam Cherry, Jeremy Kidd, Heidi Kuehl, Carliss Chatman, Sarah Fox, Kali Nicole Murray, and attendees at both the 2019 Criminal Justice Ethics Schmooze and CrimFest 2019. The author is especially grateful to the
editors and staff of the University of Richmond Law Review, who were kind enough to show
me infinite patience during challenging times, particularly with the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic.
1. Jon Swaine, Oliver Laughland, Jamiles Lartey & Ciara McCarthy, Ties That Bind:
How the Bond Between Police and Prosecutors Impedes Justice, GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015,
8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/ties-that-bind-conflicts-of-int
erest-police-killings (quoting a statement made by Professor Samuel Walker of the University of Nebraska) [https://perma.cc/6UFB-GGHT].
2. John Buchanan, Police-Prosecutor Teams: Innovations in Several Jurisdictions,
NAT'L INST. JUST. REP., May–June 1989, at 2, 2 (quoting NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW
OBSERVANCE & ENF’T, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 17 (1931)).
3. Id.
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death.4 Some prosecutors dole out rewards for meeting a minimum
yearly conviction rate, introducing perverse incentives for prosecutors to cooperate closely with police, even if investigators engage in
misconduct, and to opt to take easy, rather than deserving, cases
to trial.5
A police and prosecutor divide is popularly depicted in television
and movies with perhaps the best known example being Law &
Order, whose opening lines depict a system in which the two camps
seldom, if ever, meet.6 In contravention of this understanding, however, police have been shown to exert a great deal of power not just
in how a prosecutor prepares for trial, but also how prosecutors
engage in plea bargaining.7 There is no uniform system or standard by which the prosecutor-police relationship is regulated
throughout the country, leading to a pastiche of policies that not
only differ from state to state on the federal level, but also county
to county and town to town on a local level.8
This close cooperation between prosecutors and police, however,
has started to extend beyond just plea bargaining and trial preparation. In some cities, police and prosecutors have begun to work
together to influence policy and flummox criminal justice reform.

4. See Swaine et al., supra note 1.
5. In an infamous example, former Colorado Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney
Carol Chambers awarded felony prosecutors bonuses for achieving a seventy percent minimum conviction rate in at least five trials per year. While Chambers correctly explained
that “it is hard to find performance standards by which to measure trial attorneys,” her
assertion that using a minimum conviction rate standard “best meets the need to have a
performance standard” is grossly misguided at best. See Jessica Fender, DA Chambers Offers Bonuses for Prosecutors Who Hit Conviction Targets, DENV. POST (May 4, 2016, 5:58
AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2011/03/23/da-chambers-offers-bonuses-for-prosecutorswho-hit-conviction-targets/ [https://perma.cc/5B6Q-497D].
6. For readers unfamiliar with the show, it attempts to explain that the criminal justice system is divided in two: “the people are represented by two separate but equally important groups: The police who investigate crime, and the district attorneys, who prosecute
the offenders.” These lines, of course, present a gross oversimplification of a much more
complex system with many more moving parts such as defense attorneys, judges, juries, and
probation agencies. While this may seem of little import, it should be acknowledged that
such media influences what the public “believe[s] about criminal justice and what we think
ought to be done about crime are based on content that has been parsed, filtered, recast,
and refined through electronic, digital, visually dominated, multimedia entities” such as
television and movie studios. See Ray Surette, Media, Criminology, and Criminal Justice,
in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY (2018).
7. See generally Jonathan Abel, Cops and Pleas: Police Officers’ Influence on Plea Bargaining, 126 YALE L.J. 1730 (2017).
8. Id. at 1733, 1743.
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Before Wesley Bell was recently sworn in as St. Louis County Prosecutor after defeating an incumbent, assistant prosecutors and
their investigators took the extraordinary step of voting privately
to join the St. Louis Police Officers Association.9 Bell took drastically different positions than his predecessor while campaigning
for office, expressing a commitment to “oppose[] the death penalty,
back[] treatment instead of jail for people accused of minor drug
crimes, pledge[] to reform the cash bail system, . . . promise[] to set
up” a conviction integrity unit, and “pledge[] to hold police officers
accountable for wrongful acts.”10
Prosecutors unionizing with police, of course, present a host of
ethical conflicts of interest, not just for both groups, but for the
union as its own entity, especially when conflicts between police
and prosecutors arise. Prosecutors joining police unions would also
likely bolster the view that prosecutors collude with the police to
prevent criminal justice reform from taking root even with reformist elected prosecutors in office and that such offices are usually
systemically racist.
Police unions, along with other public employee unions, have
been viewed with suspicion by those along the entire length of the
political spectrum, with conservatives often arguing that allowing
collective bargaining for such unions increases the costs of providing services, while those on the left argue that such unions can slow
reform.11 In their article Police Unions, Professors Catherine Fisk
and L. Song Richardson explain that the view that unions obstruct
reform is understandable given that “past [Department of Justice]
civil rights interventions and consent decrees have encountered
[police] unions as obstacles to implementation of reform.”12

9. Akela Lacy, Before Criminal Justice Reformer is Even Sworn In, St. Louis Prosecutors Have Joined a Police Union, INTERCEPT (Dec. 20, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://theintercept.
com/2018/12/20/wesley-bell-st-louis-prosecutor-police-union/
[https://perma.cc/Z35S-DT
MP].
10. Debra Cassens Weiss, Conflict Questions Raised About Prosecutors’ Vote to Join Police Union, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 21, 2018, 11:28 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/conf
lict-questions-raised-about-st.-louis-county-prosecutors-vote-to-join-police-union [https://pe
rma.cc/YUJ6-WMHB].
11. Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712,
716–17 (2017).
12. Id. at 716.
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Police officers and prosecutors often enjoy much more robust
protections in their employment than workers in the private sector.13 They enjoy greater freedoms in exercising First Amendment
rights and are more shielded from the retaliation that may follow
in the workplace.14 They also are entitled to due process before termination of employment, unlike most private sector employees
who work on an “at will” basis.15 Police are also very frequently
unionized, and these unions often advocate for specific legislation
benefitting law enforcement and influencing criminal justice policy.16 In considering the relationship between police, police unions,
and prosecutors, this Article will employ a similar approach in
adopting a broader definition of “union” than would usually be discussed in labor law; the term “union” is used “more loosely to capture the full range of police labor organizations,” given that many
law enforcement groups that identify themselves as unions are not
affiliated with organized labor otherwise or “may or may not be
certified as the exclusive representative of the officers on whose
behalf they negotiate.”17
Apart from the ethical conflicts that face prosecutors through
working too closely with police and their unions, the formation of
generalized law enforcement unions runs counter to the original
goals addressed by the first formalized labor unions in the United
States. If anything, law enforcement and those who would be identified as working class today were often at odds during the colonial
period in which the rudimentary criminal justice system of each of
the colonies punished idleness, forcing able-bodied men to work.18
The early 1800s saw workers who attempted, if informally, to unionize and strike and picket for better wages successfully charged
13. Id. at 718.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 715, 748.
16. For example, the website of the International Union of Police Associations describes
itself like so: “While I.U.P.A.’s officers, active and retired law enforcement officers, fight to
improve the lives of their brothers and sisters in law enforcement, I.U.P.A. works to improve
legislation that protects and affects public safety officers, as well as representing the needs
of law enforcement officers and support personnel, whether that be for better equipment,
more staff or a fair wage.” Our Mission, INT’L UNION POLICE ASS’NS, https://iupa.org/ourmission/ [https://perma.cc/TM4Z-9GX7].
17. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 11, at 733–34 (citing DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY,
DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 181, 183 (2008)).
18. See, e.g., THE LAW AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 25 (Hunting Library 1998)
(1648) (“[No one] shall spend his time idlely or unproffitably [sic] under pain of such punishment as the Court of Assistants or County Court shall think meet to inflict.”).
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and prosecuted for conspiracy.19 After Reconstruction, prosecutors
and police worked together to undermine the gains made by formerly enslaved Blacks, including “lien laws for landlords, vagrancy
laws,” laws criminalizing luring workers from current employment
with the promise of better wages and conditions, as well as laws
criminalizing walking off the job.20 The late 1800s saw labor frequently conflict with management, law enforcement, and the
courts. The alignment between the courts, attorneys, and law enforcement as a larger group of middle-class professionals against
working class and poor laborers was only solidified with the start
of professional licensing and more formalized characterizing of
some forms of work as skilled versus unskilled.21
Policing and its American origins can largely be traced back to
the institution and enforced brutalization of Blacks through slavery, with the Carolina colony forming its own slave patrol in 1704
and other slave patrols and night watches often evolving into the
modern police departments that are now familiar.22 Such law enforcement mechanisms were developed through the oppression of
other vulnerable groups as well. Private police and private prosecution were popular in the 1800s, so popular that some state laws
authorizing private prosecution still persist on the books.23 The authorization of private police forces, while still currently popular,24
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
20. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 505 (2d ed. 1985).
21. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890–
1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 489, 493–94, 503, 526–29 (1965).
22. Olivia B. Waxman, How the U.S. Got Its Police Force, TIME (May 18, 2017, 9:45 AM)
https://www.time.com/4779112/police-history-origins [https://perma.cc/9HFP-3XVS]. This
Article does not claim, however, that American policing only originates with slave patrols
nor does it attempt to give a complete history of policing in the United States; a number of
factors and functions gave rise to what we know as the police today. These include night
watchmen, English constabulary, and child welfare and protection functions.
23. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 564–65 (2005); Michael Edmund
O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 659, 659–60 (2010);
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 423 (2009) (first citing Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested
Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q.
85, 103–07 (1992); then citing Thomas J. Robinson, Jr., Private Prosecution in Criminal
Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 300 (1968); and then citing Andrew Sidman,
Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754 (1976)).
24. A number of private colleges and universities employ their own police forces that
have either similar or identical powers as other public police forces. See Eliza Gray, Why
Universities Have Their Own Armed Police Forces, TIME (July 30, 2015), https://time.com/
3979288/cincinnati-shooting-university-police-forces/ [https://perma.cc/92LH-A7JW]. Some
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proliferated with the rapid industrialization of the nation. For example, within a year of authorizing railroad companies to employ
police forces in Pennsylvania, “collier[ies], furnace[s] or rollingmill[s]” were also given the authority to form their own private police forces with the aim of strikebreaking and antagonizing organized labor.25 The history that undergirds law enforcement, both
police and prosecutors, can be troubling to those who may align
themselves with pro-labor causes when the purpose of police and
prosecutor unions are often antithetical to pro-labor values.
Nowadays, police unions and prosecutor groups such as the National District Attorneys Association (“NDAA”) attempt to operate
under the guise of more traditional labor unions and organizations
when they are anything but. They instead often work to exert political influence and clout in their own best interests, rather than
those that are prioritized by formalized ethical guidelines, such as
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for the Prosecution Function.
The consolidation of power between prosecutors and police, however, can be even outside the context of formalized unions that are
joined by members of both camps. A recent and prominent example
can be observed in the continued struggle over California’s felony
murder rule, which once classified homicides committed during a
set of enumerated felonies as first-degree murders, even if the
homicide in question was unintended.26 California Senate Bill 1437

of these police forces have even met opposition of late. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Full Shutdown,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 8, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/05/08/johnshopkins-students-escalate-sit-over-proposed-campus-police-force [https://perma.cc/64KQ-9
6A2]; Public Safety Initiatives: Frequently Asked Questions, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Apr. 18,
2019) https://publicsafetyinitiatives.jhu.edu/faq/#what-is-the-status-of-the-proposal-fromlast-spring-seeking-state-authority-to-establish-a-university-based-police-department-atjohns-hopkins [https://perma.cc/SH5A-6LCX].
25. J.P. SHALLOO, PRIVATE POLICE: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PENNSYLVANIA 59–
60, 88 (1933).
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2017). These potential felony murders include
homicides committed “in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking,” and a number of other predicate crimes. Id. The felony murder rule originated in the early 1700s through caselaw and
treatise in England. Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403,
413–14 (2011) (first citing Rex v. Plummer (1701) 84 Eng. Rep. 1103, 1104; then citing
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 86–87 (photo. reprt. 1978)
(1716); and then citing Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57
STAN. L. REV. 59, 88–92 (2004)).
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(“S.B. 1437”), signed by former Governor Jerry Brown and intended to go into effect on January 1, 2019, rankled both police and
prosecutors in California alike.27 The California State Sheriffs’ Association, California Police Chiefs Association, and California District Attorneys Association were each opposed to the elimination of
the felony murder rule, with each group attempting to lobby the
state legislature against S.B. 1437.28
This Article argues that, with the once-unheard-of step of prosecutors and police unionizing together in St. Louis, and with relationships between prosecutors and police trending toward growing
closer all the time, government at all levels—federal, state, and local—should consider the potential risks of such relationships. Part
I explores different types of relationships that go beyond what was
once the traditional working relationship between police and prosecutors, including formalized labor unions, employee association
groups, friendships, and even marriages. Part II discusses the varying conflicts and deleterious effects that such close relationships
cause, unduly influencing investigation priorities and other policies. Part III theorizes as to different steps that may be taken to
alleviate the risks inherent in overly cozy relationships between
police and prosecutors.
I. DANGEROUS LIAISONS
The following Part explores and provides examples not only of
the formalized joining in labor unions of police and prosecutors—
though those relationships merit an entire article of their own and
will be the subject of the next article in this series—but also informal relationships between the two, of which both the public and
legal academics may not be entirely cognizant. These include associations that have not been granted collective bargaining powers,
27. S. 1437, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018); Artie Ojeda, Changes in California’s Felony Murder Law Could Set Hundreds Free, NBC SAN DIEGO (Oct. 9, 2018, 9:27 PM),
https://nbcsandiego.com/news/local/change-in-califs-felony-murder-law-could-set-hundreds
-free/50478/ [https://perma.cc/UW3B-3VBS]; Dan Walters, Walters: California’s Felony Law
Repealed? Maybe Not?, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 19, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.mercurynew
s.com/2019/02/19/walters-californias-felony-law-repealed-maybe-not/ [https://perma.cc/M6
B6-APJJ].
28. Jordan Smith, Landmark California Law Bars Prosecutors from Pursuing Murder
Charges Against People Who Didn’t Commit Murder, INTERCEPT (Nov. 23, 2018, 11:30 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/11/23/california-felony-murder-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6HXXRU8W].
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such as the NDAA and a number of police associations, as well as
friendships and even romantic and sexual relationships.
A. American Police and Public Safety Unions
Though private sector labor unions have been suffering a loss of
influence due to a number of factors, such as the proliferation of
“right to work” laws and the pervasiveness of moonlighting jobs
commonly known as “side hustles,” police unions and other public
sector unions have flourished.29 There has been a shocking dearth
of scholarship investigating the specific role of police unions and
their negative effects on moving criminal justice reform forward
until recently, particularly after Robert McCulloch failed to secure
a grand jury indictment against Darren Wilson after the shooting
death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.30
Public sector unions have found themselves situated quite differently from private sector unions. While private sector unions developed in the United States in some rudimentary form starting in
the 1800s, public sector unions were only acknowledged by federal
and state governments starting in the 1960s.31 Public sector unions
have come to represent public employees from all levels of government—local, federal, and state—and from a wide range of jobs,
such as postal workers, teachers and professors, and firefighters.
Police, along with prosecutors, however, embody unique roles
and powers far beyond those that other public employees are
granted. Both members of the executive branch, police have the
power to use physical force against the public in the course of their

29. Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1335
(2020).
30. See id. at 1336 (first citing Fisk & Richardson, supra note 11, at 713–22; then citing
Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 238–39; then citing
Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1222 (2016); then citing Marcia L.
McCormick, Our Uneasiness with Police Unions: Power and Voice for the Powerful?, 35 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47, 54–63 (2015); then citing Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts,
66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1122–39 (2017); and then citing Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform
Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1404–05 (2015)).
31. McCormick, supra note 30, at 52 (first citing Collective Bargaining in the Public
Sector, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1676, 1676–77 (1984); and then citing Joseph Slater, The Strangely
Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 511, 516–19 (2013)).

ROMERO 544 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

PROSECUTORS AND POLICE

10/5/2020 12:58 PM

1105

duties,32 while the prosecutor wields immense discretion in who to
charge with a crime, what to charge, and the ability to dispossess
individuals, in some cases, of the inalienable rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”33 Both roles are also unique in
that, rather than providing a service, like public works or utility
employees with customers or clients, prosecutors and police have
no discernable client in a conventional sense apart from an amorphous one to be found in federal, state, or local governments themselves.34
To a large extent police and prosecutors came into their roles
roughly contemporaneously. By 1877 every state had adopted the
formalized structure of employing elected prosecutors at one level
of government or another, and these prosecutors began to consolidate their power in the face of organized crime in the early 1900s.35
Police, on the other hand, gained power as the definition of “public
order” evolved over time. With the rise of private sector unions and
greater rates of immigration from countries like Ireland, Italy, and
Germany, management in the late 1800s relied on police to engage
in strikebreaking and harassment of immigrants and the working
class in a most contradictory fashion given that many of them were
working class themselves.36
The development of public sector and public safety unions, however, was completely derailed by the Boston Police Strike of 1919.
Police at the time had an understandably long list of grievances,
including exceptionally long work hours, low pay, and restrictions

32. HOWARD S. COHEN & MICHAEL FELDBERG, POWER AND RESTRAINT: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF POLICE WORK 56 (1991).
33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
34. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58
B.C. L. REV. 463, 465 (2017) (“Prosecutors’ clients are sovereignties, abstract public entities
whose interests are hard to define.” (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)
(“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done.”))).
35. Maybell Romero, Profit-Driven Prosecution and the Competitive Bidding Process,
107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 171, 175 (2017) (first citing Michael J. Elis, Note, The
Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1530 (2012); and then citing Allen
Steinberg, The “Lawman” in New York: William Travers Jerome and the Origins of the Modern District Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 753 (2003)).
36. See Waxman, supra note 22.
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on their freedom of movement during what we would now call “personal time off.”37 In response to these conditions, the police officers
attempted to join the American Federation of Labor after rejecting
a number of offers from then Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge.38 On September 9, 1919, the officers went on strike, with seventy-two percent of them not reporting for work.39 Though there
was an observable increase in petty crime such as looting, most of
the city remained peaceful even with the dramatic decrease in police officers patrolling streets.40 Coolidge disparaged the strikers,
labeling them “traitors.”41
The national reaction to the strike was less than sanguine.
Newspapers reviled the strike, labeling it as “Bolshevism”; the New
York Times argued that police should not have the power to unionize at all, especially given that “one of [an officer’s] duties is the
maintenance of order in the case of strike violence.”42 This type of
public sentiment set police officers back on a path of working
against the working class and members of other unions. The
United States would not see a police officer strike again until July
1974 in Baltimore.43 It was also not until the late 1960s and early
1970s that police officers attempted and began to form their own
unions.44 Prosecutors, on the other hand, have only recently begun
to start formally unionizing. While they have long had federations

37. FRANCIS RUSSELL, A CITY IN TERROR: CALVIN COOLIDGE AND THE 1919 BOSTON
POLICE STRIKE 48 (1930).
38. Joseph Slater, Labor and the Boston Police Strike of 1919, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF STRIKES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 239–51 (Aaron Brenner, Benjamin Day & Immanuel Ness
eds., 2009). “The basic issue was the right of the police to form a labor union in affiliation
with the American Federation of Labor. Should a body of workers be denied the privilege of
organizing a union because of the peculiar nature of their occupation?” Richard L. Lyons,
The Boston Police Strike of 1919, 20 NEW ENG. Q. 147, 147 (1947).
39. ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919–1920, at
126 (1955).
40. Boston Police Force Out on Strike; Mobs Smash Windows and Loot Stores; Steel
Workers Confer on Strike Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1919.
41. PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 98
(1988). Coolidge conveniently used the strike as a stepping stone to greater national renown
and to, of course, the presidency.
42. The Boston Police Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1919.
43. Ben A. Franklin, Baltimore Ends Its 15-Day Strike, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1974, at 1,
22.
44. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 11, at 736.
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and other affiliate groups such as the NDAA and other state prosecutors associations, those groups will be considered infra section
I.B.
St. Louis County has been ground zero for the unionization of
local prosecutors, which, as of the publication of this Article, is
headed by elected district attorney Wesley Bell.45 Bell has said that
prosecutors’ actions in unionizing are “troubling”: “Not only does it
create conflict, but when we’re trying to build trust with the community, law enforcement and the prosecutor’s office, it’s simply unacceptable and I for one will not tolerate it.”46 While prosecutors
have not unionized in Kim Gardner’s Circuit Attorney’s Office, the
St. Louis Police Officers Association has demonized Gardner as “a
menace to society” in the wake of the decision to prosecute former
Missouri Governor Eric Greitens.47
B. Labor Federations and Affiliate Groups
Formalized labor unions, however, are not the only mechanisms
by which prosecutors and police form unacceptably close working
relationships. Both law enforcement and prosecutor federations
and associations have been exploiting their political and financial
clout in efforts to influence elections (often in each other’s races)
and lawmaking. A particularly jarring example can be found in
some of the most recent district attorney races in the Bay Area,
specifically those in the East Bay. Pamela Price, an Oakland civil
rights attorney, decided to challenge incumbent Alameda District

45. A Vision for Justice, ST. LOUIS COUNTY PROSECUTING ATT’Y, https://stlouiscountyprosecutingattorney.com/wesleybell [https://perma.cc/F46K-8KY8]; David Hunn, St. Louis
County Prosecutors Vote to Unionize, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 18, 2018), https://
www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-county-prosecutors-vote-to-union
ize/article_e8422a8f-0fbb-584c-96b6-ff4391b6c6b0.html [https://perma.cc/4ASW-3BXB].
46. Danny Wicentowski, Prosecutors Wesley Bell and Kim Gardner Take Shots at Police
Union During Panel, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019, 11:54 AM), https://www.riverfront
times.com/newsblog/2019/01/25/prosecutors-wesley-bell-and-kim-gardner-take-shots-at-pol
ice-union-during-panel [https://perma.cc/7AKR-DPCD].
47. Rebecca Rivas, Gardner Files Federal Suit via Ku Klux Klan Act, ST. LOUIS AM.
(Jan. 13, 2020), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/gardner-files-federal-suit-via
-ku-klux-klanact/article_aa7041ca-3652-11ea-b34c-efa0bee99ee0.html [https://perma.cc/SN
Q6-TKFZ].
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Attorney Nancy O’Malley, running on a “progressive”48 platform.49
Police associations throughout Alameda County—Berkeley, Oakland, and Fremont, among others—started giving a string of contributions to the O’Malley campaign.50 Price, the challenger, however, received a large donation from the California Justice & Safety
PAC, totaling $416,000.51 In response, police associations far afield
from Alameda County, including those in San Jose and Los Angeles, made significant donations of their own; O’Malley received
$317,000 in donations from police associations alone.52 In neighboring Contra Costa County, police associations donated $54,699
to Paul Graves, who was then challenging incumbent district attorney Diana Becton, along with spending $147,329 on pro-Graves
campaign mailers.53
Prosecutors’ associations, too, are involved in significant lobbying efforts. In a ruling addressing life insurance for a deceased district attorney’s family, District Court Judge Dee D. Drell acknowledged that, while the NDAA, headquartered in Alexandria,
Virginia, does not deal with employers as a collective bargaining
agent, it does “engage[] in policy-driven lobbying efforts, particularly at the national level.”54 As Professor Bruce Green has explained, the NDAA views itself as a group entirely apart from other
attorneys and attorney associations, including the ABA.55 The
NDAA has often found itself in conflict with the ABA and its efforts
to promulgate ethical rules related to the prosecutorial function.56
The NDAA has, additionally, characterized the ABA as a “left-wing
lobbying group” incapable of representing some separate, special
48. It is debatable whether a prosecutor can truly be progressive given that nature of
the job. This Article, however, accepts the generally mainstream use of the term “progressive” in signaling a platform, candidate, or prosecutor whose stated aim is to reform some
aspect of the criminal justice system, such as mass incarceration.
49. Darwin Bond Graham, Police Union Money Flooded the East Bay’s District Attorneys’ Races, EAST BAY EXPRESS (June 6, 2018), https://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/pol
ice-union-money-flooded-the-east-bays-district-attorneys-races/Content?oid=16716753
[https://perma.cc/J6NB-64TC].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Papale v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 1:09-cv-01405, 2010 WL 2195294, at
*3 (W.D. La. May 26, 2010).
55. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 873, 886 (2012).
56. Id.
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interest of prosecutors.57 The NDAA has also, for example, lobbied
for a tougher juvenile justice system,58 as well as employed lobbying firms to advocate for prosecutors on obtaining special student
loan forgiveness programming and funding.59 Troublingly, the
NDAA has also prioritized closer relationships with police. An
NDAA president explained that it “needs to reach out to and work
more closely with other groups, such as the International Chiefs of
Police (IACP), the FOP, National Sheriffs’ Association, National
Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), and victims’
rights groups, etc.”60
Local prosecutors’ associations have also done their part to slow
the progress of reformist efforts. As noted by journalist Jessica
Pishko, prosecutors’ associations “do not just ‘enforce’ the law; in
fact, they help to make it.”61 A recent effort to institute bail reform
in New York State stalled after the District Attorneys Association
of the State of New York (“DAASNY”) intervened.62 The DAASNY
has long made its intention to influence the drafting of legislation
clear; with its formation in 1909 it explained, “While the intentions
of the legislators are of the best, they oftentimes enact laws . . .
which embarrass the prosecuting attorneys of the state.”63
Recently, United States Attorney General William Barr spoke at
the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police’s conference on August
12, 2019.64 During this speech he excoriated fellow prosecutors attempting to follow more progressive policies. His speech characterized reformer prosecutors as being “anti-law enforcement” and
“anti-police,” with responsibility for “fanning disrespect for the
57. Id. (quoting Brief for National District Attorneys Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (No. 10-8145)).
58. James D. Polley, IV, Capital Perspective, PROSECUTOR, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 14.
59. John Kaye, Letter to the Editor, Student Loans, FLA. B. NEWS, Nov. 1, 2003, at 3.
60. Christopher D. Chiles, Goals of NDAA’s New President, PROSECUTOR, July/Aug./
Sept. 2009, at 4, 10.
61. Jessica Pishko, Prosecutors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice Reform, NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-are-bandingtogether-to-prevent-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/97XS-WRJK].
62. Josie Duffy Rice, Prosecutors Aren’t Just Enforcing the Law—They’re Making It,
APPEAL (Apr. 20, 2018), https://theappeal.org/prosecutors-arent-just-enforcing-the-law-th
ey-re-making-it-d83e6e59f97a/ [https://perma.cc/78YC-NYQC].
63. Id.
64. Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks at the Grand Lodge Fraternal
Order of Police’s 64th National Biennial Conference, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 12, 2019), https:
//www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grand-lod
ge-fraternal-order-polices-64th [https://perma.cc/7T6A-W8TC].
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law.”65 His speech was jarring in its open pandering to police officers, in which he stressed the convenience and safety of police rather than the constitutional rights of civilians or improving the policing function, explaining that:
We need to get back to basics. We need public voices, in the media and
elsewhere, to underscore the need to “Comply first, and, if warranted,
complain later.” This will make everyone safe—the police, suspects,
and the community at large. And those who resist must be prosecuted
for that crime. We must have zero tolerance for resisting police. This
will save lives.66

C. Personal Relationships
It should not be discounted that close personal relationships
such as friendships and even romantic attachments develop between police and prosecutors, as can be expected in just about any
workplace setting. Given the power of both police and prosecutors,
however, these personal affinities can lead to poor and potentially
dangerous decisions that affect the lives of innocent bystanders.
This becomes clear when examining yet another example from St.
Louis.
On August 13, 2019, the Missouri Supreme Court suspended the
licenses of two former assistant St. Louis circuit attorneys, Ambry
Nichole Schuessler and Katherine Anne Dierdorf.67 Both attorneys
65. Id.
66. Id. The term “zero tolerance” has its own complicated history and a rigid law enforcement system where all violations of rules are enforced against alleged suspects, as well
as a lack of prosecutorial discretion and mandatory minimum punishments. See Sheldon
Wein, Exploring the Virtues (and Vices) of Zero Tolerance Arguments 3–4 (Univ. of Windsor
Ont. Soc’y for the Study of Argumentation, 2013), https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcont
ent.cgi?article=2141&context=ossaarchive [https://perma.cc/Y7CY-4ELZ].
There has been some controversy worldwide with regard to the concept of zero-tolerance
policing. The International Association of Chiefs of Police states that the duties of police
consist of “serving the community, safeguarding lives and property, protecting the innocent,
keeping the peace, and ensuring the rights of all to liberty, equality and justice.” MATTHEW
B. ROBINSON, JUSTICE BLIND? IDEALS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 176
(3d ed. 2009). Zero-tolerance policing, however, runs counter to those objectives, as
[t]o whatever degree street sweeps are viewed by citizens as brutal, suspect,
militaristic, or the biased efforts of “outsiders,” citizens will be discouraged
from taking active roles in community-building activities and crime prevention
initiatives in conjunction with the police. Perhaps this is why the communities
that most need neighborhood watch programs are least likely to be populated
by residents who take active roles in them.
Id. at 194.
67. See In re Schuessler 578 S.W.3d 762, 776 (Mo. 2019).
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were dishonest in covering up an assault of a suspect by police that
resulted in charges against the suspect being filed by a mutual
friend of both attorneys, an assistant circuit attorney herself.
On July 22, 2014 the suspect, Michael Waller, was severely
beaten while handcuffed by St. Louis police officer Thomas Carroll.
Carroll allegedly beat Waller for possessing his daughter’s stolen
credit card, which Waller said he had found.68 Bliss Barber Worrell, a friend of Officer Carroll who also happened to be another
circuit attorney, told Dierdorf about the beating, who then failed to
advise supervisors.69 Officer Carroll described how he beat Michael
Waller on a conference call with Schuessler and Worrell; when the
officer described inserting his gun in Waller’s mouth, Schuessler
responded by making a homophobic joke.70 Both Schuessler and
Dierdorf withheld this information from supervisors, even after
Waller was falsely charged with a felony for fleeing custody.71 At
one point, when attempting to coordinate their responses to any
questions, Dierdorf told Schuessler, “I told them I don’t know anything. You don’t tell them you know anything either.”72 While
Schuessler told supervisors that Dierdorf told her that Worrell
filed false charges, she never revealed that she heard Carroll describe the beating during the conference call.73
The circuit attorney manual provided to all assistant circuit attorneys explained that “being a good public servant means knowing how to handle the demands of your work with character and
discipline” and that circuit attorneys should refuse “to let official
actions be influenced by personal relationships.”74 Dierdorf,
Schuessler, and Worrell were all good friends who spent time together outside of work. Worrell and Officer Carroll were also close
friends; “[t]hey talked frequently on the telephone,” and spent significant time together, including time training for a marathon.75
68. Jennifer S. Mann, St. Louis Police Detective Accused of Beating Suspect Leaves Job
as Questions Mount, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 27, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-police-detective-accused-of-beating-suspect-leaves-job
/article_b5fd3343-b6c9-5b9c-9c69-4a57a7605967.html [https://perma.cc/C7E5-7EJ5].
69. See In re Schuessler, 578 S.W.3d at 765–66.
70. Id. at 766.
71. Id. at 766–67.
72. Id. at 767.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 773.
75. Id. at 766.

ROMERO 544 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1112

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

10/5/2020 12:58 PM

[Vol. 54:1097

The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that Dierdorf was repeatedly dishonest, not just in an effort to protect herself, but to
protect her circuit attorney friends as well.76 The court also concluded that Schuessler acted with the same motivations: she neither wanted to expose or hurt her friends and stated she felt additional pressure to lie given that she was Dierdorf’s roommate.77
II. QUANDARIES ARISING THROUGH CLOSE PROSECUTOR AND
POLICE RELATIONSHIPS
The variety of relationships in which prosecutors and police engage present a number of dangers, the most serious of which this
Part intends to explore. Fraternization between police and prosecutors creates a risk of conflicts of interest both in the unionization
context as well as in the administration of justice. These conflicts,
importantly, obstruct the role that prosecutors are to serve as ministers of justice. These conflicts can manifest in financial (creating
more work for oneself), political, and personal ways. Greater unity
between prosecutors and police implicates a number of challenges
when they, essentially, comprise a unified function; oftentimes
prosecutors are elected while police chiefs are appointed. This consolidation of power not only presents a risk of usurping the political
will of those in a jurisdiction who elected a district attorney, but
also introduces many of the same types of challenges that arise in
vertical monopolies. An additional danger of unionization and
greater closeness between police and prosecutors is increasing
opacity in the criminal justice system, with police protecting prosecutors and prosecutors protecting police, slamming a hard break
on burgeoning criminal justice reform.
In Berger v. United States, the United States Supreme Court explained the ethical duties incumbent upon prosecutors:
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with

76. Id. at 775.
77. Id.
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earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.78

While Berger appears to clearly set forth what prosecutors should
do—as well as what they should not do—in the name of prosecuting vigorously, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence since then has
become wholly inadequate to address or prevent prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors are consistently protected from real scrutiny
or transparency when the Court has so narrowly defined those situations under which the harmless error doctrine will not apply.79
The Supreme Court has also offered precious little in the way of
ethical guidance for prosecutors, at one point abdicating any responsibility for doing so by asserting that “[t]he Due Process
Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecutors.”80 As Professor Angela J. Davis has noted, such standards that prosecutors know are
permissive and lax can at least explain in part why prosecutorial
misconduct has become as common as it has in recent years.81
The ABA also purports to provide some guidance to prosecutors
with respect to their duties through its Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“Model Rules”), which have been adopted by every state
to some extent,82 as well as through its Criminal Justice Standards
for the Prosecution Function (“ABA Prosecution Standards”).83 The
Model Rules, however, are rules that apply to lawyers who represent distinct and easily definable clients and are not tailored to the
unique obligations that might be found in the prosecutorial role at
all.84 The question of whom the prosecutor represents and what his
or her duties are to such a client can lead to greater abstraction
than there would be for other attorneys. While it seems clear that

78. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
79. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
127 (2007).
80. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984).
81. DAVIS, supra note 79, at 127 (explaining that the harmless error rule “permits, perhaps even unintentionally encourages, prosecutors to engage in misconduct during trial
with the assurance that so long as the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is clear, the conviction will be affirmed.”); Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 280–81 (2007).
82. Romero, supra note 35, at 166–67.
83. Id. at 166.
84. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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prosecutors represent “the people” rather than individual clients,85
and that their duty is to “seek justice”86 rather than focus solely on
the needs of one individual, these definitions are so very nebulous
that they provide very little guidance or limitation upon prosecutors in practice.87 While prosecutors’ offices may attempt to formulate their own internal regulations and guidelines, “an institutional reluctance to unduly restrict their own discretion makes it
even more unlikely that prosecutors would promulgate overly specific guidelines” by which to abide.88
This Part proceeds as follows. Section II.A explains the lack of
ethical oversight and remedies against misconduct by both prosecutors and police that have been established by Supreme Court jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983. Section II.B
orients the reader to characteristics of the ideal prosecutor. Sections II.C–D review some of the dangers inherent in overly close
working relationships between police and prosecutors, including
potential conflicts of interest and usurpation of the prosecutorial
role.
A. Supreme Court Treatment of Prosecutorial and Police
Misconduct
1. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Warren Court ushered in a period of greater expansion and
recognition of defendants’ rights in its criminal procedure jurisprudence. Mapp v. Ohio prohibited prosecutors from using illegally
seized evidence.89 Gideon v. Wainwright established the right to
counsel for defendants charged with felonies in state courts.90
Brady v. Maryland had the effect of mandating prosecutors to turn

85. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1577
(2003).
86. Id.
87. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
837, 900–01.
88. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 519–20 (1993).
89. See 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
90. See 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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over exculpatory evidence to the defense.91 Under Miranda v. Arizona, Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination
were extended to police interrogation, resulting in the famous Miranda warning being formulated that would serve as the standard
right to silence warning given by police in the United States.92
These seminal criminal procedure cases were all decided over the
course of only three years.
In 1967, however, the Court in Chapman v. California held that
some constitutional errors were minor enough that they could be
categorized as being harmless, and that judgments should not be
reversed for such errors.93
The institution of the harmless error rule in resolving constitutional questions drastically narrowed the opportunity afforded to
appellants arguing for reversals and new trials based on constitutional violations committed by prosecutors; it allowed judges to
substitute their own judgments as to the harmlessness of an error
rather than leaving such a question to a jury.94 Even with the institution of the harmless error rule, it is, arguably, impossible for
a judge to determine with any certainty whether a jury would find
an error harmless or not.

91. See 373 U.S 83, 87 (1963).
92. See 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966).
93. See 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
94. By its very nature, harmless error review would seem to allow the appellate court,
in varying degrees, to encroach on these interests by making factual assessments about the
impact of a constitutional error upon the jury’s fact-finding process. Indeed, some have argued that “[t]he greatest cost of the harmless constitutional error rule is its usurpation of
the jury function.” Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional
Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2056 (2008) (quoting Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 430
(1980)).
Professor Gershman has characterized the drawbacks of the harmless error rule and its
requirement of a showing of prejudice as a “fiasco,” explaining that it
modifies prosecutorial behavior in the most pernicious fashion: it tacitly informs prosecutors that they can weigh the commission of evidentiary or procedural violations not against a legal or ethical standard of appropriate conduct,
but rather, against an increasingly accurate prediction that the appellate
courts will ignore the misconduct when sufficient evidence exists to prove the
defendant’s guilt.
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 425 (1992).
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The Burger Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence began a
long period of constriction of defendants’ rights, particularly in relation to prosecutorial misconduct.95 The Burger Court’s decisions,
according to Professor Bennett L. Gershman, “evince[d] a consistent, unyielding philosophy of judicial permissiveness toward
prosecutorial excesses.”96 Decisions such as United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal97 and California v. Trombetta98 made it much more
difficult to assert the rights that had been previously expanded under the Warren Court: Valenzuela-Bernal required a showing by
the defense that evidence lost by the government was both material and exculpatory (which is extraordinarily difficult when the
evidence has been lost),99 while Trombetta required defendants to
show that evidence not preserved by the government had a readily
apparent exculpatory value before destruction and that comparable evidence was unobtainable.100 In Mabry v. Johnson, the Burger
Court also further constricted the rights of defendants attempting
to enter plea bargains, holding that acceptance of a prosecutor’s
offer created no constitutional right to its enforcement.101
The development and direction of Supreme Court jurisprudence
in the area of prosecutorial misconduct and criminal procedure, as
explained above, creates incentives for prosecutors not only to misbehave in an effort to get a competitive edge on their opponents,
but also to approach their jobs in a lackadaisical fashion. Given the
high hurdles established by the Court mandating showing the existence of such misconduct in conjunction with the harmless error
rule, reversals of convictions and personal discipline of prosecutors
are exceedingly rare.102 As explained by Professor Ellen
Yaroshefky, the harmless error rule “dilutes appellate supervision
of disclosure obligations. Without uniform oversight of prosecutors’
disclosure decisions, it is difficult to know how many violations actually occur.”103

95. Bennett L. Gershman, The Burger Court and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 21 CRIM. L.
BULL. 217, 217 (1985).
96. Id. at 218.
97. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
98. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
99. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872–73.
100. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489.
101. 467 U.S. 504, 510 (1984).
102. Gershman, supra note 95, at 224–25.
103. Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick
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John Thompson was exonerated of a 1985 robbery and murder
that occurred in New Orleans after eighteen years in prison, with
fourteen of those spent on death row.104 Just a month before his
scheduled execution date, an investigator working with Thompson’s attorneys found undisclosed exculpatory evidence consisting
of a blood swatch taken from a victim’s pants stained with the robber’s blood.105 The swatch was sent to a crime lab, which determined that the blood was type B.106 Prosecutors never had Thompson’s blood typed and were not aware of what blood type he had.107
Prosecutors did not mention the swatch nor the lab report produced after testing at the trial. They also never disclosed the existence of either the swatch or report to Thompson’s defense counsel
in either the trial for the robbery or the murder.108
Thompson’s investigator found the lab report fourteen years
later in the New Orleans Police Crime Laboratory’s files.109 Thompson’s blood was tested, revealing that it was type O rather than the
type B blood found on the swatch.110 After this information was
presented to the prosecuting attorneys, they moved to stay Thompson’s execution and vacate the robbery conviction.111 Though the
Louisiana Court of Appeals, based on Fifth Amendment grounds,
reversed Thompson’s murder conviction, the district attorney retried Thompson for murder in 2003 with the jury finding him not
guilty.112
Understandably, Thompson sued the city of New Orleans under
§ 1983 for causing him (1) to be wrongfully convicted, (2) to be incarcerated for eighteen years, and (3) to almost be executed several
times over.113 Two theories of liability were alleged: (1) a Brady
violation that occurred when information regarding the blood
swatch was not shared with the defense and was “caused by an
v. Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 917–18 (citing United States v. Jones, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D. Mass. 2009)).
104. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011).
105. Id. at 54–56.
106. Id. at 55.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 56.
110. Id. at 55–56.
111. Id. at 56.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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unconstitutional policy of the district attorney’s office,” and (2) a
Brady violation that occurred due to Connick—the lead prosecutor—failing to train subordinates on how to avoid such violations.114 A jury awarded Thompson $14 million in damages based
on his second theory of liability but rejected the first.115 The city,
however, appealed, and argued that without a showing that Connick was aware of similar Brady violations, he could not have been
“deliberately indifferent to an obvious need for more or different
Brady training.”116
The Supreme Court agreed with the city, holding that a district
attorney’s office cannot be held liable under § 1983 for failing to
provide training for prosecutors based on one Brady violation
alone; the Court agreed that without a pattern of Brady violations,
Connick could not be aware of, and therefore could not be indifferent regarding, a need for training.117 A prosecutor plainly violating
and ignoring their duties to disclose exculpatory evidence was now
not enough for Thompson to recover. In essence, any route by
which Thompson could seek to recover was blocked; individual
prosecutors already enjoyed absolute immunity and now the city
would not be held liable without a showing that its internal policies
were unconstitutional in and of themselves.
While Connick may seem to address a narrow and very fact-specific issue, it serves as a barometer as to how the Supreme Court
will regard future cases in which the wrongfully convicted may attempt to recover civilly. The Court has seemed to make its sympathies known, and they do not appear to lie with victims of prosecutorial misconduct.
2. Police Misconduct
The effort to secure some sort of legal remedy in the fight against
police misconduct and brutality has been as unavailing as that
against prosecutorial misconduct. The standards for prevailing on
a § 1983 claim arising from police misconduct have been lifted unreachably high.118 The burden to meet in obtaining any injunctive
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 71–72.
Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV.
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relief against police departments is similarly prohibitive, often requiring a showing not only of a pattern of misbehavior, but also
that of a deliberate, purposeful policy on the part of police.119
The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has, unfortunately, greatly expanded the situations in which the use of force
can be found “justified,” while a similarly expansive qualified immunity doctrine allows for police to practically operate however
they wish as long as they cannot be shown to be “plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”120 The Court’s most
recent § 1983 opinions have also left that law defanged, with the
Court insisting that “clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case” such that “the rule of qualified immunity . . . [not be converted] into a rule of virtually unqualified
liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract
rights.”121 While holding prosecutors responsible for their misconduct may seem daunting, given the protections afforded to law enforcement by the Court, neutralizing the negative effects of problematic relationships between police and prosecutors will best be
approached by intervention and change on the prosecutorial front
first.
B. Prosecutorial Culture and Ethical Duties
The ABA’s Model Rules have been adopted throughout the country, with each state largely adopting the rules as their own
guides.122 The NDAA has also promulgated its own standards for
prosecutors. No state, however, has adopted them, leaving the decision to use them up to prosecution offices and perhaps individual
prosecutors.123 The NDAA’s efforts may be seen as rather laudable
given that the Model Rules, in large part, only address issues faced
by attorneys who represent discernable clients.124 Similarly, the

1773, 1776–77 (2016) (first citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988);
and then citing Connick, 563 U.S. at 68).
119. Id. at 1776 (first citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983); and
then citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976)).
120. Id. at 1777 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
121. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (citations omitted) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987)).
122. Romero, supra note 35, at 178.
123. Davis, supra note 81, at 285.
124. Id. at 282.
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ABA has also adopted its own ABA Prosecution Standards.125
These standards, however, are entirely aspirational and are unenforceable.126
Most of the Model Rules are interpreted as being as applicable
to prosecutors as they are to other attorneys.127 Only one rule was
written specifically with prosecutors in mind—Rule 3.8, which covers surprisingly little of what prosecutors actually do day by
day128 and also “does not specifically prohibit prosecutorial practices that produce clear injustices in the process.”129 While many
have advocated for further Model Rules to be drafted specific to the
prosecution function and with more rigorous standards, the likelihood of the ABA taking on such a project is miniscule. Any such
effort would likely face vociferous opposition from prosecutors130
who would bristle at any new rules that might place limits on their
conduct and increase their exposure to disciplinary action.131
In an address to an audience at the University of Washington
School of Law’s symposium on “The Prosecutorial Ethic: A Tribute
to King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng,” Patrick J. Fitzgerald,
then the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and current partner at Skadden, shared his thoughts regarding the building of an ethical prosecutor’s office.132 Early in his address Fitzgerald shared an observation: “We see in life that culture
can affect how people behave.”133

125. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
126. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 461,
474 (2017).
127. Id. at 469.
128. Interestingly, “a comment to Rule 3.8 cautions that prosecutors cannot be tagged
with misconduct when they make a ‘good faith’ but erroneous judgment that new exculpatory evidence need not be disclosed or investigated . . . [P]rosecutors are virtually the only
lawyers who benefit from a good faith exception in the ethics rules.” Id. at 479 (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 9) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
129. Davis, supra note 81, at 288.
130. “The thirty-year review of prosecutorial ethics is largely a story about federal prosecutors’ obstruction of ethics regulation at every turn . . . .” Green, supra note 126, at 480.
131. Id. at 483.
132. Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Thoughts on the Ethical Culture of a Prosecutor’s Office, 84
WASH. L. REV. 11, 11 (2009); Professionals: Patrick Fitzgerald, SKADDEN, https://www.skad
den.com/professionals/f/fitzgerald-patrick [https://perma.cc/6TPU-2F4L].
133. Fitzgerald, supra note 132, at 14.
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What sort of culture should prosecutors’ offices strive to inculcate? In his article The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, Professor Bennett L. Gershman highlights a rather poetic statement by Justice
Robert H. Jackson as to what the prosecutor should be:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to
define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be
told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and
sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the abuse of
power, and the citizen’s safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal
with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves
the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with
humility.134

How a prosecutor may be able to share such an ideal if those who
need to have it explained to them would not comprehend may be a
bit of a mystery, however. In many ways it is easier to specify what
a good prosecutor should not be. Most, if not all, scholars of prosecutorial ethics would agree that a good prosecutor should not be
motivated by conviction rates or personal gain; these are the types
of motivations that inspire the type of wrongdoing that results in
prosecutorial misconduct and error.
Many concerned with prosecutorial ethics would likely agree
that the main duty of a “prosecutor is to seek justice . . . , not merely
to convict.”135 Popular culture has frequently lauded fictitious prosecutors as heroes, depicting them as principled guardians of freedom and public welfare, a sort of bulwark against a lapping tide of
criminality and deviant behavior.136 Mandates upon prosecutors to
seek justice as well as to be ministers of justice elevate the job to a
“grand and noble vocation, unlike any other.”137 A great emphasis
on the uniqueness, power, and importance of the prosecutorial role

134. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS,
309, 351 (2001) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6 (1940)).
135. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2017).
136. Romero, supra note 35, at 175–76.
137. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355, 377 (2001) (first citing Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of
Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 224–45 (2000); then citing Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 45 (1991); and then citing H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an
Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1973)).
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may have the effect of rendering prosecutors detrimentally both
self-righteous and self-important.
At this juncture of this Article, it is important to note that not
all prosecutors suffer from overinflated senses of themselves on the
job. Rather, this Article should be thought of as highlighting the
risks that go along with a certain prosecutorial culture as well as
suggesting methods to counter the development of such culture before its formation. It is also important, however, to remember that
when discussing the abstract points regarding the prosecutorial
role, prosecutors are still people with their own personal motivations that do not necessarily vanish when being told that they
should only seek justice. These motivations, such as “[p]ersonal beliefs, predispositions, preferences, and the desire for peer approval”
most certainly affect a prosecutor’s performance.138 Prosecutors,
understandably, want to think they are actualizing good in their
communities and that what they do is just and right.139 This can
lead to an un-nuanced and overly simplified view of the world and
the defendants against whom they initiate cases.140 With such a
worldview, a prosecutor’s goals may also become much simpler,
such as caring about winning cases over anything else.141
Winning and other personal motivations are not what should influence a prosecutor’s decision making in the least. While the vagaries of Model Rule 3.8 have been discussed above, the rule opens

138. Katie M. True, Note, Restricting Prosecutors’ Powers: Increasing Oversight to Reinstate Corporate Interests, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1533 (2007) (first citing WILLIAM T.
GORMLEY, JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
PERFORMANCE 37 (2004); then citing MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE
EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 111–14 (1978); then citing Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2470–71 (2004); and then citing Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It Is Not Whether
You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality
Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CALIF. W. L. REV. 283, 289–92 (2001)).
139. Smith, supra note 137, at 378–79.
140. Id. at 380.
141. “[P]rosecutors care more about winning their cases than serving as neutral ministers of justice. Rather than ensure that convictions are obtained fairly and the innocent
protected, prosecutors place undue emphasis on their win-loss ratios and ‘keep personal
tallies’ of their conviction rates to advance their own careers.” Alafair S. Burke, Talking
About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2127 (2010) (quoting Kenneth Bresler, “I
Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 537, 541 (1996)).
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by stating, “A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”142 As ministers of justice,
prosecutors should, ideally, be actively involved in criminal justice
reform efforts and in finding ways to redefine their roles in relation
to the communities they serve with the goal to make them better.
Prosecutors can work to end mass incarceration,143 promote sentencing reform,144 end the death penalty,145 or advocate economic
reforms to raise individuals and families out of poverty rather than
focus on the encompassing need to win cases or chase after personal gain that may provide motive to intentionally commit some
forms of misconduct. Prosecutors can and should be most interested in the proverbial health of their communities.
C. Conflicts of Interest
1. Prosecutorial Conflicts
Nearly every state in the nation has adopted, to one extent or
another, the ABA’s Model Rules.146 The ABA, in an effort to provide
additional guidance to government attorneys, has also promoted
its ABA Prosecution Standards.147 While the ABA Prosecution
Standards have not been widely adopted like their Model Rules
counterparts, and are meant to serve as aspirational guidance,

142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
143. See Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2016).
144. See R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 996–97 (2014).
145. Aramis D. Ayala, state’s attorney for Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit, made a principled decision shortly after taking office in early 2017, announcing that her office would
not seek the death penalty in the future. She has faced significant backlash from law enforcement and Governor Rick Scott, who removed Ms. Ayala from potential capital cases.
Frances Robles & Alan Blinder, Florida Prosecutor Takes a Bold Stand Against Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/us/orlando-prosecut
or-will-no-longer-seek-death-penalty.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R74X-X2CM].
146. See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A., https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professio
nal_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ (last updated Mar. 28, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/C425-XSWF].
147. Romero, supra note 35, at 179. The ABA has also issued standards for criminal
defense, with both sets of standards together comprising the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice.
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Justice Stevens explained that the Supreme Court “frequently
finds [the Standards] helpful.”148
The prosecutor’s role is unique in that there is not an individual,
identifiable client, such as in criminal defense or even private practice. The Prosecution Standards explain that
[t]he prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular
government agency, law enforcement officer or unit, witness or victim.
When investigating or prosecuting a criminal matter, the prosecutor
does not represent law enforcement personnel who have worked on
the matter and such law enforcement personnel are not the prosecutor’s clients. The public’s interests and views are should be [sic] determined by the chief prosecutor and designated assistants in the jurisdiction.149

It appears that the Prosecution Standards have long envisioned
that there may be a conflict of interest that could arise and develop
when prosecutors and police work too closely, as they also warn
that prosecutors “should maintain respectful yet independent
judgment when interacting with law enforcement personnel.”150
Given its distrust of the ABA, the NDAA has drafted its own set
of prosecution standards. Unsurprisingly, the NDAA’s standards
are not only longer than the ABA’s Prosecution Standards but also
less stringent, holding prosecutors to a more relaxed code of conduct.151 Under Standard 1-3.3(d) addressing “Special Conflicts,”
the NDAA recommends that prosecutors should excuse themselves
“from any investigation, prosecution, or other matter where personal interests of the prosecutor would cause a fair-minded, objective observer to conclude that the prosecutor’s neutrality, judgment, or ability to administer the law in an objective manner may
be compromised.”152
In marked contrast from the ABA Prosecution Standards, the
NDAA standards specifically address immunity. Rather than serv-

148. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 440–41 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017).
150. Id. § 3-3.2.
151. See generally NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS (NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N 2009).
152. Id. § 1-3.3(d).
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ing as a rule of conduct, Standard 1-6.1 reads as a policy recommendation to legislators to expand prosecutorial immunity, exhorting that
[w]hen acting within the scope of his or her prosecutorial duties, a
prosecutor should enjoy the fullest extent of immunity from civil liability. The chief prosecutor should take steps to see that all costs, including attorneys’ fees and judgments, associated with suits claiming
civil liability against any prosecutor within the office arising from the
performance of their duties should be borne by the prosecutor’s funding entity.153

The NDAA standards also depart wildly from the ABA in their
recommendations regarding working with law enforcement. Rather than the respectful distance called for by the ABA, the NDAA
tells chief prosecutors to “actively seek to improve communications
between” prosecutors’ offices and police, even advocating for uniform information sharing systems.154 The NDAA standards also
encourage keeping law enforcement abreast of progress on cases,
cooperating and assisting with law enforcement training, and having a “liaison officer” from each law enforcement agency within a
prosecutor’s jurisdiction assigned to work with prosecutors, with
the liaison officer informing other officers of developments in the
cases they investigated.155 The commentary accompanying these
rules attempts to reason that a close relationship between prosecutors and police is necessary for a functioning criminal justice system, again in marked contrast to recommendations by the ABA.156

153. Id. § 1-6.1.
154. Id. § 2-5.1.
155. Id. §§ 2-5.2 to 2-5.5.
156. Id. § 2-5 cmt. The drafters of the NDAA standards appear to have taken pains to
explain why fostering extremely close relationships with law enforcement is necessary and
to identify strongly with law enforcement as a whole. The commentary addressing “relations
with law enforcement” explains that
[t]he maintenance of good relations between the prosecuting attorney and the
law enforcement agencies within the community is essential for the smooth
functioning of the criminal justice system. Both parties have the burden of fostering, maintaining, and improving their working relationship and developing
an atmosphere conducive to a positive exchange of ideas and information.
Id. It seems that the drafters of the NDAA rules only envision a conflict of interest arising
from the interrelation of police and prosecutors when prosecutors take the drastic step of
functioning as law enforcement in-house counsel, warning prosecutors against providing
advice “on civil or personal matters.” Id.
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2. Conflicts Among Union Members and Capture
A unique potential conflict of interest arises when considering
the potential for conflict between prosecutors and police in the context of formalized labor unions. While police and prosecutors have
enjoyed closer relationships of late, what is to become of police and
prosecutors who have unionized formally when there is a work-related conflict between the two? The doctrine of exclusivity features
prominently in labor law, and “provides that a union has the exclusive right to speak for its members in bargaining with an employer over wages, hours and conditions of the workplace.”157 A union and its representative would, necessarily, encounter a clear
conflict of interest if a prosecutor were to file a grievance against a
police officer in a case of, for example, excessive use of force. Formalized labor unions between police and prosecutors would introduce yet another institutionalized barrier to reporting and uncovering misconduct on both sides.
D. Usurpation of Roles and Duties
The prototypical American chief prosecutor enjoys a rather
unique position in the greater world of criminal justice systems:
“The United States is the only country in the world where citizens
elect prosecutors.”158 When prosecutors are elected they are “usually elected by the voters of the county or district which they represent.”159 The unique role of the American elected prosecutor
arose during the Jeffersonian era, when a “commitment to popular
sovereignty,” at least for a select segment of the population, drove

157. Adrienne L. Saldaña, Note, Conflicting Interests in Union Representation: Should
Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 133 (1992); see, e.g., NLRB v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
158. Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528,
1530 (2012). The election of prosecutors, allowing local, community control of government—
and not just prosecutors—was unique in the 1830s: “[T]he organization of towns and counties in the United States is everywhere based on the same idea, namely, that each is the
best judge of what pertains only to itself,” while the “first consequence of this doctrine was
to have all the administrators of towns and counties chosen by the residents themselves.”
Id. at 1558 (footnote omitted) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
91–92 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004) (1835)). It is important to note, however, that not
all chief prosecutors in the United States are elected and that there are a variety of ways
chief prosecutors are hired for their jobs. See Romero, supra note 35, at 171.
159. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys § 9 (2018) (citing Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 131
N.E. 573, 573–74 (Mass. 1921)).
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the formation of some of the institutions seen in the United States
today.160 This new and unique prosecutorial role was just one of
many such roles that arose of out of the early Republic’s new and
novel form of government in which both federal and state governments were organized around three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.161 This form of government, however, and its reliance on the concept of separation of powers introduced a new type
of concern not only in the study of government but in government’s
practical function: separation of powers.
Prosecutors are members of the executive branch and serve, to
some extent, as “the executive’s agents, charged with enforcing the
law.”162 There has, understandably, been great attention given to
separation of powers problems that arise when judges attempt to
interfere with the prosecution function or even usurp the prosecutor’s role through, for example, getting deeply involved with plea
bargaining,163 or even being granted the power to terminate prosecutions from the bench “in the interest of public justice.”164
While close relationships the types of which have been discussed
above occur exclusively between what might be viewed as leaves of
the same executive branch, such relationships introduce some of
the same concerns as may be seen in violations of the separation of
160. LAURA J. SCALIA, AMERICA’S JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT: REMAKING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, 1820–1850, at 6–8 (1999).
161. The notion of “separation of powers” was first articulated by political philosopher
Charles-Louis de Secondat, more commonly known as Montesquieu, who proposed and promoted a model of political authority in which power is divided among the (now) traditional
three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. He also argued that the three separate
branches were required to act independently of each other to promote liberty most effectively. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. XI, ch. V, at 182
(Thomas Nugent trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1900) (1748).
162. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1071, 1085 (2017).
163. See Rishi Raj Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute Resolution Perspective, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 565, 583–84 (2015).
164. See John P. Zanini & Jeremy Bucci, “The Interests of Public Justice” and the Judicial Decision to Terminate Criminal Prosecutions: Silencing the Voice of the People, 26 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 163, 163–64 (2000) (arguing that allowing for judicial
terminations of prosecutors amounts to a separation of powers violation depriving the electorate of their opportunity to direct prosecution priorities).
Professor Valena Beety recently examined judicial involvement in prosecutions given that
twelve states currently allow judges to dismiss cases in the interest of justice. She argues
that such dismissals can be used to hold actors such as prosecutors and police responsible
and accountable for their misdeeds and advocates for more states adopting statutes to enable their judges to do so. See Valena E. Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice,
80 MO. L. REV. 629, 642–43 (2015).
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powers. While most chief prosecutors, be they district attorneys,
county attorneys, or city attorneys, are elected, police chiefs are
appointed, usually by a mayor or city council.165 The further commingling of both prosecutorial and police roles undercuts the
meaning and purpose of how both roles are filled, particularly the
popular election of prosecutors who should maintain some professional distance from their police chief counterparts.
This same problem may be understood better by employing the
administrative framework of capture. In the regulatory context,
“[c]apture refers to an extremely close relationship between regulators and industry.”166 Some definitions emphasize the process by
which capture occurs while others, such as that advanced by Professor Paul Quirk, focus on the end results of capture: a regulatory
agency that has been captured “persistently serv[es] the interests
of regulated industries to the neglect or harm of more general, or
‘public,’ interests.”167 While capture theory was once fairly limited
in its application to regulatory agencies, leading to “robust judicial
review of agency action” starting in the 1980s,168 “capture theory’s
pessimism about the performance of administrative agencies has
been generalized to include all political institutions.”169 Just as in
private industry, both political and economic forces influence police, prosecutors, and the manners in which they relate and work
together. Police have an interest in capturing the prosecutorial
function: they may enjoy greater cover from public scrutiny if protected by prosecutors, such as in lethal force investigations and

165. David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sheriff as a Distinctive Policing
Modality, 14 AM. J. POLICE 123, 127 (1995). The role of police chief is often dramatically
different than that of a county sheriff. County sheriffs usually have a much broader set of
duties to fulfill, “including serving process and maintaining the county jails, but [they] may
not have law enforcement authority,” while police chiefs “are generally limited to law enforcement and patrol.” James Tomberlin, Note, “Don’t Elect Me”: Sheriffs and the Need for
Reform in County Law Enforcement, 104 VA. L. REV. 113, 123 (2018) (citing Falcone & Wells,
supra, at 130–33).
166. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 570
(2012).
167. PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1981).
168. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 378 (2009).
169. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1053 (1997).
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prosecutions, as well as benefit financially from certain prosecutions, such as those that might be lucrative given the potential for
civil asset forfeiture.
III. INTERVENTIONS
A. New (to Prosecutors) Public Health Approaches to Cultural
Change
While arguing that prosecutors should refocus their priorities to
helping realize criminal justice reform may sound fine and well,
getting prosecutors invested in doing so is a different and seemingly impossible matter. Other industries, however, have been
faced with analogous problems and have begun to work toward solutions that may be useful in the context of prosecutorial ethics and
misconduct. Physicians, in particular, have also been known to be
self-important and self-righteous like prosecutors, potentially leading to poor judgment calls as well as error and misconduct.170 Once
a taboo topic among physicians, “One of the great achievements of
the last [nearly twenty] years is that medical error and patient
harm are now acknowledged and discussed publicly by healthcare
professionals, politicians and the general public.”171 The same
should happen with prosecutorial error and misconduct, including
ethical missteps arising from problematic relationships with police.
1. The Normalization of Deviance
One may wonder whether prosecution and the practice of medicine are similar enough to even consider turning to public health
models in an effort to minimize prosecutorial misconduct and error. Prosecution, being a subset of law enforcement, carries out
“hazardous activities . . . in large, complex organizations, by, for
the most part, dedicated and highly trained people.”172 In much the
same way that medical malpractice and error may seriously harm

170. See Allan S. Berger, Arrogance Among Physicians, 77 ACAD. MED. 145, 145–77
(2002). Dr. Berger exhorts his fellow physicians that “[W]e are but instruments of healing
and not its source. We should not exaggerate our own importance.” Id. at 147.
171. See CHARLES VINCENT, PATIENT SAFETY 14 (2d ed. 2010).
172. See id. at 123.
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patients, potentially exposing them to loss of livelihoods, injury,
pain, and in severe instances, death, prosecutors also have the
power and ability to deprive the accused of “normal” lives in which
they can maintain jobs, family relationships, community connections, and other hallmarks of a normal and productive life through
incarceration and other punishments such as probation. When improperly wielded, the prosecution function presents a serious danger not only affecting individual defendants, but also their families
and other groups who may rely upon them. In this sense, prosecution may even be viewed analogously to other dangerous industries
that have the potential for devastating impact upon individuals
and communities such as aviation or nuclear power; an accident in
either of these industries could have devastating human consequences. Rampant prosecutorial misconduct may also have the effect of seriously eroding public trust, not only in the criminal justice system but also in other government functions or provided
services.
The Challenger Space Shuttle launch and accident, in particular, has served as an important touchstone in organizational culture literature.173 A massive independent investigation revealed
that one of the “O-ring” seals on a rocket booster split open during
liftoff due to the usually chilly temperatures at Cape Canaveral in
Florida on the morning of launch.174 In her work on the accident,
Professor Diane Vaughan found that, rather than the accident being primarily attributable to the wrongdoing of one person alone,
the organizational characteristics and culture of NASA were what
really facilitated the conditions for potential failures.175 These included an unmanageable contractor structure that made it difficult
to discuss potential problems with the O-rings, and, perhaps more
significantly for purposes of this Article, a culture focused on success and a “can do” approach that likely influenced that decision to
move forward with the launch rather than postponing, as well as
systemic regulatory ineffectiveness allowing safety to be deprioritized.176

173. See, e.g., DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1997).
174. Id. at xi.
175. Id. at 34.
176. Id.
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Vaughan’s study was also revolutionary in introducing the concept of the normalization of deviance in organizations. The Challenger accident did not occur due to the intentional wrongdoing of
one person but rather was caused by a group of people working
together with a lack of attention to the consequences of their actions.177 It was also caused by incremental change from the usual
organization norms of prioritizing safety rather than being able to
launch on a target date.178 Such normalization of deviance does not
involve any overt intent to do wrong. However, just as in the Challenger accident, such normalization may still lead to “disastrous
consequences [that] can emerge from the banality of organizational
life.”179
Both prosecutorial and physician culture are reminiscent of the
organizational culture that Vaughan noted in NASA. Prosecutors
are generally very “success oriented” in much the same way as
NASA, but rather than focusing on launch dates, their focus is on
winning.180 As detailed supra in Part I, incremental change in the
normative boundaries of prosecutorial ethics has been accomplished through Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has offered
stronger and more vigorous protections for prosecutors who have
committed misconduct over time.
The prosecution function has even more in common with the
healthcare industry than with aerospace, however.181 Just as with
177. Id. at 409.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 410.
180. See Bresler, supra note 141, at 541–43; Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 882 (1995) (discussing “prosecutorial culture centered on winning”).
Paul Butler has evocatively related his personal experience with a winning-centered prosecutorial culture:
What prosecutors have in common with most other lawyers is that they are
competitive and ambitious. We all like to win. For prosecutors, that means getting tough sentences and defeating defendants’ claims that the police violated
their constitutional rights. Getting promoted, and maintaining the professional regard of your peers, requires keeping your eye on the prize.
PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 116 (2009).
181. Professor Bruce Green has examined medical and prosecutorial analogues in connection with disclosure obligations under Brady. He argues that medical analogies are not
well applied to the prosecutorial role, focusing on medical error review and error avoidance.
Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2171–72
(2010). He reasons that there are a number of reasons why prosecutors would not wish to
systemically review cases where there may have been a lack of compliance with disclosure
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having to see the doctor, most if not all individuals would rather
not be in the predicament of being prosecuted and interacting with
a district or state’s attorney. Much as with healthcare, the prosecution function is necessary and operates constantly in an effort to
control and eliminate crime, which has been likened to a moral and
societal disease.182 Ideally, criminal prosecutors practice preventive care in their communities and advocate for social, economic,
and legal change while looking for other ways to prevent the conditions that lead to crime before it is ever committed. Prosecutors,
just as physicians, should endeavor to “first do no harm,”183 and if
failures such as malpractice occur, to investigate why they occurred “with a view to preventing similar failures in the future.”184
Traditional medical approaches to misconduct and error were
similar to that found today not just with prosecutors, but the legal
obligations but that it is likely useful for medical professionals when “[d]one right” and potentially helpful in creating a culture where doctors can learn from mistakes. Id.
Professor Green highlights a “key difference between learning from medical error and
learning from prosecutors’ disclosure error is the nature of the mistakes in question and
their relationship to the respective professionals’ perceived mission.” Id. at 2172. He argues
that the “doctor’s role is to heal the sick, not make them worse. When doctors make mistakes
that kill or otherwise harm clients, they achieve the very opposite of what they are fundamentally seeking to accomplish. This is not the case when prosecutors withhold discovery.”
Id.
Some of this analysis, however, glosses over some of the nuances of a physician’s role as
well as that of the prosecutor. If abiding by the Hippocratic Oath of “do no harm,” doctors
may find themselves duty bound not necessarily to treat illness, but to provide palliative
care to patients who would rather not go through painful treatments and cures. In some
circumstances, it may be possible to provide a patient a good outcome but a poor experience
outweighing the good outcome and causing harm overall. In this sense, the physician’s goal
to “do no harm” is very fact dependent upon the patient in question just as the prosecutor’s
role to “seek justice” is fact dependent upon the case at hand.
Professor Green’s analysis also accepts some traditional assumptions of what the prosecutor’s role is or should be. If an individual prosecutor decides to withhold evidence, they do
the opposite of what they should be accomplishing, which is seeking justice. A review of
disclosure procedures and mistakes may go beyond what is traditionally conceived of as
“error,” including mistakes in which prosecutors may have neglected to provide exculpatory
evidence to defense counsel or “near misses” in which such disclosure is made in such a way
that is disadvantageous to a defendant but does not rise to the level of a Brady violation. In
any event, this Article’s focus goes beyond the application of public health and medical models to Brady and disclosure obligations. It rather looks to such models as examples of how
to change prosecutors’ perceptions of their selves, their roles, and to the larger issue of improving prosecutorial culture.
182. L.L. Stanley, Disease and Crime, 14 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 103
(1923).
183. This phrase is a modernized interpretation of the Hippocratic oath. VIRGINIA
SHARPE & ALAN I. FADEN, MEDICAL HARM: HISTORICAL, CONCEPTUAL, AND ETHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF IATROGENIC ILLNESS 6–7, 81 (1998).
184. Id. at 29.
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profession as a whole. Such efforts focused on achieving what has
been termed the “perfectibility model,” which espouses the view
that if physicians have proper training and were sufficiently motivated, that they would make no mistakes.185 These goals were pursued largely through tools already familiar to the legal profession:
(1) training, such as that received in medical or law school; and (2)
punishment, in which one person is singled out as the blameworthy
actor and cause of some type of improper performance.186 Both the
traditional medical and legal responses to misconduct are entirely
reactive.187 The medical and public health fields, however, have
been undergoing drastic changes in the way medical error has been
perceived and managed, and this Article argues that it is time prosecutors follow their lead.188
2. Disrupting an Entrenched Culture: A Medical Example
On November 22, 2013, three-year-old Nora Boström died in a
hospital room in the Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital in Palo
Alto, California.189 She was four and a half months premature
when she was born on December 11, 2009.190 After being released
from the hospital where she had stayed for 129 days in a Neonatal
Intensive Care Unit, Nora was diagnosed with pulmonary hypertension.191 Pulmonary hypertension is characterized by high blood
pressure in the arteries leading to the lungs and causes “the blood
vessels that carry blood from [the] heart to [the] lungs [to] become
hard and narrow,” necessitating the heart to pump harder to continue circulating blood.192

185. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1851, 1852 (1994).
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. A deeper exploration of how aerospace and other dangerous industries manage the
normalization of deviance and how that should bear on prosecutorial ethics will be offered
in a subsequent Article tentatively titled “Zero Tolerance Prosecutorial Ethics.”
189. Sarah Kliff, Do No Harm, VOX (July 9, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/7/
9/8905959/medical-harm-infection-prevention [https://perma.cc/V47N-N4FL].
190. Claire McCormack, Nora Boström, PATIENT SAFETY MOVEMENT, https://patientsafe
tymovement.org/advocacy/patients-and-families/patient-stories/nora-bostrom/ [https://per
ma.cc/UZ7K-684Z].
191. Id.
192. Pulmonary Hypertension, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. MEDLINEPLUS, https://medline
plus.gov/pulmonaryhypertension.html [https://perma.cc/Q3N6-EZBZ].
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Roughly a year before her death, Nora had a central line catheter placed through her chest.193 Central line catheters run directly
to the heart, allowing for quick access to the major venous system,
making such catheters particularly effective in quickly administering medications.194 Conversely, the use of central line catheters is
a major risk factor for bloodstream infections.195 From the time
that Nora’s central line was placed to her death, she had suffered
four central line infections, with each infection leaving her in a
more weakened and precarious state than the last.196 A “presumed
central line infection” likely led to the septic shock that caused
Nora’s death.197 After sending an intent to sue notice to the Packard Children’s Hospital as required to initiate medical malpractice
claims in California, Nora’s parents received a reply from the hospital’s risk manager, stating that, “Unfortunately, the placement
of central lines is associated with a risk of infection. . . . There is a
risk of infection—in the best of circumstances—which can never
entirely be eliminated.”198
Central line bloodstream infections are not a rarity, however,
but rather a “major cause of healthcare-associated morbidity and
mortality.”199 What was to be done about the proliferation of such
serious hospital-borne blood stream infections? Since the use of
central line catheters starting in the 1950s, “[w]e told ourselves
this story, at the time, that these infections were inevitable and

193. Kliff, supra note 189.
194. E. Jedd Roe, III, Central Venous Access via Infraclavicular (Subclavian/Subclavicular) Subclavian Approach to Subclavian Vein, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 7, 2018), http://emedicine.
medscape.com/article/80336-overview [https://perma.cc/VA3A-RPPE]; Kliff, supra note 189.
195. R. Monina Klevens, Jonathan R. Edwards, Chesley L. Richards, Teresa C. Horan,
Robert P. Gaynes, Daniel A. Pollock & Denise M. Cardo, Estimating Health Care-Associated
Infections and Deaths in U.S. Hospitals, 2002, 122 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 160, 160–64 (2007);
Didier Pittet, Debra Tarara & Richard P. Wenzel, Nosocomial Bloodstream Infection in Critically Ill Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality, 271 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1598, 1598–1601 (1994).
196. Kliff, supra note 189.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infections, IOWA DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, https:
//idph.iowa.gov/hai-prevention/information/clamsi [https://perma.cc/ZLT4-KLEJ]; Klevens
et al., supra note 195, at 161; Pittet et al., supra note 195; see also John P. Burke, Infection
Control—A Problem for Patient Safety, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 651 (2003); Leonard A. Mermel, Prevention of Intravascular Catheter-Related Infections, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
391, 391 (2000).
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that if you get an infection, it is what it is.”200 This is a fatalism
that may be familiar to those who study prosecutorial misconduct,
as misconduct and error by prosecutors is often presumed to be inevitable.
A 2006 study in the New England Journal of Medicine, An Intervention to Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections in
the ICU, was among the first to start upending the dangerous acceptance of supposed inevitability of such infections.201 A physician
participating in the study admitted, “When I got involved in the
project, I had some skepticism. The mindset by most people prior
to 2004 was that infection was just an accepted risk for having one
of these catheters placed.”202 The results of the study, however,
showed otherwise: after implementing reforms from instituting
checklists and strengthening the “safety culture” of the 103 participating hospitals during the eighteen-month study period, incidences of catheter-related bloodstream infections plummeted by
sixty-six percent.203 This study, however, is only part of a trend
seen in infection control and public health emphasizing prevention
of hospital-acquired infections as a whole, with a target for “zero
tolerance” of such incidence being greatly emphasized as a way not
only to improve patient safety and outcomes, but also in helping
hospitals’ bottom lines.204
Prosecutors would be much more amenable to cultural change
and reform, including providing the more distanced assessment of
police action and misconduct, if “inclusive rhetoric that recognizes
that even virtuous prosecutors who strive to do justice might inadvertently err” was employed.205 While the assignation of blame
would still have a place in those cases in which a prosecutor intentionally and maliciously misbehaves to the detriment of a defendant, the use of no-fault language and discourse when a prosecutor’s

200. Kliff, supra note 189 (quoting Dr. Peter Pronovost, director of the Armstrong Institute for Patient Safety and Quality at Johns Hopkins University).
201. Peter Pronovost, Dale Needham, Sean Berenholtz, David Sinopoli, Haitao Chu,
Sara Cosgrove, Bryan Sexton, Robert Hyzy, Robert Welsh, Gary Roth, Joseph Bander, John
Kepros & Christine Goeschel, An Intervention to Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections in the ICU, 355 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2725, 2725–30 (2006).
202. Kliff, supra note 189.
203. Pronovost et al., supra note 201, at 2726–27, 2731.
204. See Kathy Warye & Jerome Granato, Target: Zero Hospital-Acquired Infections,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Jan. 2009, at 86, 86–87, 91.
205. Burke, supra note 141, at 2131.
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office is seeking to learn from prior mistakes “would avoid alienating prosecutors and instead invite them to contribute, individually
and collectively, to the prevention of wrongful convictions”206 and
other harms that might otherwise not be considered in court due
to the harmless error rule.
3. Military Anti-Fraternization Policies as Paradigm
A number of studies have highlighted the many similarities that
military and police cultures share, and some have even noted that
the two functions have begun to coalesce such that they can be difficult to tease out from one another.207 The increased militarization
of police, both in structure and use of equipment usually made
available to the armed forces, has also served to often blur the line
between domestic policing and other forms of militarism.208 Today’s police officers are often fighting in several wars at once: the
War on Drugs, the War on Terror, and others. Police are often perceived even as occupying and invading forces among differing communities throughout the United States, particularly those that are
poor, majority-minority, or rural.209
The military, however, is substantially different from modern
police forces in that there are stronger norms against fraternization, formally backed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
which defines a number of disciplinary offenses even beyond fraternization.210 While each of the services traditionally maintained
their own unique definition of fraternization, uniform standards
were adopted across the services in 1999 in a recognition that sep-

206. Id.
207. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Thick Green Line: The Growing Involvement of Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforcement, in MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 29, 29–32, 34–35 (Peter B. Kraska ed., 2001).
208. See Peter B. Kraska, Crime Control as Warfare: Language Matters, in MILITARIZING
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 207, at 14, 15–16, 24; Peter B. Kraska
& Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 1–5 (1997).
209. Danny Sjursen, The Disturbing Parallels Between US Policing at Home and Military Tactics Abroad, NATION (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/thedisturbing-parallels-between-us-policing-at-home-and-military-tactics-abroad/ [https://per
ma.cc/GT4M-S6CW].
210. Margaret A. McDevitt, Note, Wrongful Fraternization as an Offense Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 547, 547–50 (1984–85).
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arate policies were “corrosive to morale, particularly as [the services] move[d] toward an increasingly joint environment.”211 Fraternization has not been clearly defined precisely because it is difficult to define, just as are the problematic relationships that are the
subject of this Article:
[Fraternization] is not a concept susceptible to precise and narrow definition. Depending on the circumstances, fraternization may span the
entire spectrum of amicable human social interaction, ranging from a
passing greeting on the street to intimate sexual activity. The permutations of possible circumstances necessarily complicate any definition, and there is no easy line drawn separating essential professional
interaction from impressible fraternization.212

The concept and crime of fraternization has a long and complicated history. Such behavior has been recognized as a crime
throughout the world and at varying periods for thousands of
years,213 and originally attempted to regulate, if not prevent, financial intermingling by way of loans and gambling between officers
and the enlisted.214 Women joining the military in large numbers
starting in the 1980s then expanded what was the usual, financially based definition of “fraternization” to a larger array of interpersonal relationships.215 And while certain relationships seem
like they should be found easily improper under usual anti-fraternization norms, just as in relationships among police and prosecutors, people may “form normal, healthy relationships that often
ripen into romance, love, and eventually marriage.”216
While any regulation of human behavior, be it criminal or not,
will always be flawed and never prevent all misbehavior (however
that may be defined), that does not necessarily mean that attempting to regulate such conduct is not an endeavor worth pursuing.
Acknowledging that normal relationships may arise in the context
of serving, the military has attempted to “walk[] a tight line trying

211. Web Site Outlines Fraternization Changes, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (May 3, 1999), https:
//archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43034 [https://perma.cc/AW8Q-NCCH].
212. WALTER B. HUFFMAN & RICHARD D. ROSEN, MILITARY LAW: CRIMINAL JUSTICE &
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS § 3:329 (2018).
213. Walter T. Cox, III, Consensual Sex Crimes in the Armed Forces: A Primer for the
Uninformed, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 791, 792–93 (2007).
214. Id. at 793.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 795.
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to come up with a fair and progressive approach to the issues surrounding fraternization.”217
CONCLUSION
Though police and prosecutors, through the nature of their jobs,
are required to work together often and closely, both actors should
not be permitted to allow their respective roles to become so intertwined and mingled that the independent purposes of their jobs are
lost. This is a risk that becomes very real not only with the advent
of prosecutors joining police in formal labor unions that can engage
in collective bargaining but also with the proliferation of relationships that are built in employment associations and through other
personal connections.
As the ABA exhorts, prosecutors should keep a respectful professional distance from police, not only to avoid the types of problematic relationships explored in this Article but also to avoid the
appearance of impropriety and bad judgment. Rather than identifying so closely with the police function, prosecutors should instead
work on changing their organizational cultures such that they
work more stridently toward ensuring the health of their respective communities.

217. Id.

